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Abstract 
 
We analyse the determinants of the decline in measured research 
productivity (the patent/R&D ratio) using panel data on manufacturing 
firms in the U.S. for the period 1980-93. We focus on three factors: the 
level of demand, the quality of patents, and technological exhaustion. We 
first develop an index of patent ‘quality’ using detailed information on 
patents in the U.S. in seven technology fields. Using a factor model, we 
construct a minimum-variance index based on four patent characteristics 
and show that using multiple indicators substantially reduces the 
measured variance in quality. We then show that research productivity at 
the firm level is negatively related to the patent quality index and the 
level of demand, as predicted by an optimizing model of R&D, and 
positively related to the stock market valuation of patented innovations 
held by firms.     
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Introduction 
 
Research productivity, as typically measured by the ratio of patents to R&D, 
has declined sharply over the last forty years, in many different industries and 
countries (see Figure 1 for U.S. experience).  By 1990 the number of patents 
produced per U.S. scientist or engineer (S&E) had fallen to just 55 percent of its 
1970 level, with even steeper declines in Europe (Evenson, 1984 and 1993).  At 
any time there are also large cross-sectional differences in measured research 
productivity across industries and firms (Evenson, 1984; Griliches, 1990). These 
facts have attracted increasing attention from academics and international 
organizations such as the OECD (1991) because of concern about the apparent 
slowdown in total factor productivity since the late 1960’s. But scholarly observers 
have voiced concerns about the decline in research productivity for a long time. As 
Griliches (1990) points out, aggregate patent numbers have fluctuated widely and 
have grown more slowly than investments over much of the twentieth century. 
This fall in research productivity could simply derive from diminishing returns 
in the ‘knowledge production function’.  As markets expand, the private returns to 
R&D increase.  The induced rise in the level of R&D investment leads to a fall in 
research productivity. A number of quality-ladder growth models have formalized 
this relationship, showing that in equilibrium research productivity should fall with 
growth in demand (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993; Kortum, 1993).  Empirical studies 
using sector-level data for the U.S. and other countries typically find that market 
size does matter.  However, demand growth is not sufficient to explain the 
observed declines in R&D productivity as measured by the ratio of patents to R&D 
inputs (Evenson, 1993; Kortum, 1993). 
Thus the evidence of declining research productivity raises the specter of 
technological exhaustion – getting less inventive output for any given level of 
R&D investment.  This is of great concern.  A process of technological exhaustion 
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would lower innovative output directly and, by reducing the private returns to 
R&D, it would also bring down the equilibrium level of private R&D investment.  
These two features of technological exhaustion could undermine our ability to 
sustain growth in total factor productivity. This process could be countered with 
government policies to provide stronger R&D incentives, recharging the pool of 
invention potential through government-funded R&D and programs to strengthen 
industry-government research links.  Therefore, a key question is whether we can 
take the decline in the ratio of patents to R&D as indicating a decline in the 
fecundity of R&D – i.e., as deterioration in the underlying knowledge production 
function. 
In considering this question it is useful to break the patent to R&D ratio into its 
two component parts: the patent to invention ratio, and the invention to R&D ratio. 
A fall in measured research productivity may be real – a declining invention/R&D 
ratio – or only apparent – a declining patent/invention ratio. Since we do not 
normally have information on the number of inventions, there is an identification 
problem in interpreting changes in the patent to R&D ratio.  What appears to be 
technological exhaustion may simply be mismeasurement.  Inventors may be 
making less use of the patent system, perhaps because the costs of obtaining and 
enforcing patents have risen relative to alternative protection mechanisms. (See 
Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000, for discussion and survey evidence.)  If so, the 
observed growth in the number of patents over time understates growth in 
innovation.  Further, the average value of the innovation covered by a patent may 
be increasing over time. Both of these ‘measurement’ issues imply that counting 
patents can give a misleading impression of the true output of the research 
process.1 
                                                          
1 Evenson (1991) argues that it is reasonable to interpret variations in the patent/R&D ratio that are 
common across industries (country-year effects) as due to changes the patent/invention ratio, and those 
 2
 
 
When looking for evidence of technological exhaustion, a common approach 
taken in the literature is to look for a decline in the R&D elasticity in production 
function or total factor productivity regressions.  Focusing on R&D inputs avoids 
the potential pitfalls of measuring invention output. However, it involves other 
serious problems associated with productivity measurement (see Griliches, 1979). 
Moreover, the R&D elasticity in a production function reflects two distinct factors: 
the impact of R&D on invention, which could exhibit technological exhaustion, 
and the effect of invention on productivity. The latter depends on other 
characteristics of the firm and market, including the level of demand and the ability 
of the firm to appropriate the rents from invention. Both technological exhaustion 
and a decline in demand or appropriation imply that the rate of return to R&D 
would fall.  Econometric estimates at the firm and industry level do not show any 
systematic decline in the output elasticity of R&D through the mid-1980s, and thus 
the evidence of ‘exhaustion’ is at best inconclusive (Griliches, 1994; Hall, 1993a, 
1993b; and Griliches, 1990, for an excellent review of relevant studies).   
In this paper we use a large panel data set to examine the relationships between 
research productivity, market size and technological exhaustion at the firm level. 
Studying the micro level data allows us to avoid changes in composition of more 
aggregate data (e.g., growth in markets may encourage marginal firms to enter 
R&D activity).  We also develop a new control for the changes in the quality of 
patented output in order to separate real from apparent changes in research 
productivity. 
In micro data various indicators have been used to adjust for variation in the 
quality of patents. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) use patent renewal data to 
estimate the value of patent rights and found that adjusting for quality at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that are common across countries (industry-year effects) as due to variation in true research productivity. 
He finds evidence of negative industry-specific time trends, pointing to exhaustion. 
 3
 
 
country level accounted for most of the observed decline in patents per scientist 
and engineer. Other important indicators that have been used include the number 
patent citations (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999b), patent 
family size (the number of countries in which the patent is taken out – Putnam, 
1996), and the number of claims in the patent application (Tong and Frame, 1994). 
 
In this paper we develop a composite index of patent quality using multiple 
characteristics of patents. We use the term quality to emphasize both the 
technological and value dimensions of an innovation.  We formulate a factor model 
with four separate indicators of a patent’s underlying, unobservable quality: the 
number of claims, forward citations to the patent, backward citations in the patent 
application, and family size.  Each indicator has quality and quality-unrelated 
variation, or ‘measurement error’. The factor model is estimated using over 
100,000 patents applied for during the period 1975-1993 in seven technology areas 
- drugs, biotechnology, other health, chemicals, electronics, computers and 
communications, and mechanical. The parameter estimates are used to construct a 
minimum-variance estimator of quality for each patent, conditional on its observed 
characteristics. We show that using the composite index reduces the variance in 
patent quality substantially, to as little as one-quarter of the unconditional 
variation. 
Developing a composite quality index is an ‘information-reduction’ exercise. 
This is most useful when a single index is needed to construct a quality-adjusted 
patent measure to be used, for example, in generating more meaningful measures 
of research productivity or in econometric studies where quality-adjusted patents 
appear on the left-hand side of a regression. Even where it would be reasonable to 
use the component indicators as separate controls without imposing weighting 
restrictions, the composite may be preferred.  Individual indicators may have links 
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to the dependent variables that are not associated with quality, and in such cases a 
composite index would be more informative about the specific effect of quality 
differences. 
We find that adjusting for a rise in patent quality accounts for some of the time 
series variation in research productivity at the sector level, except in 
pharmaceuticals where there was especially fast growth in R&D.  Differences 
across firms in research productivity are related to differences in the level of 
demand and in average patent quality as predicted by theory. At the same time we 
find no evidence of technological exhaustion at the micro level, i.e., there are no 
negative time trends in research productivity, conditional on the level of R&D.  We 
find that differences in (average) patent quality across firms are strongly associated 
with the market valuation of firms, with an especially large effect in 
pharmaceuticals.  However, these relationships do not hold up in the time series 
dimension at the firm level. The patent quality index is most useful when one 
averages − either over time for firms, or over firms for a given year. The results are 
encouraging and suggest that the quality index may be useful in a wide range of 
empirical studies that require measurement of innovation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we outline a simple model of 
the relationship between R&D, market size and innovation quality.  This serves to 
highlight the difference between technological exhaustion and demand growth 
explanations for a decline in research productivity. Section 2 describes the data and 
the indicators used.  Sections 3 through 5 describe the construction of our index of 
innovation quality and discuss changes in the index over time.  In Sections 6 
through 8 we explore how the quality index relates to research productivity and the 
market value of firms.  The final section concludes. 
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1.   Analytical Framework: Research Productivity, Patent Quality and 
Demand 
 
In this section we present a stylized model of research productivity that 
incorporates patent quality. Assume that each firm has the following patent 
production function:  
 
(1) E(NftRft)= e -τt Rftβ(t)   0 < β(t) < 1, 
 
where E(NR) is the expected flow of patents and Rft is R&D expenditure in year t 
by firm f.2 Technological exhaustion can take the form of an increase in the 
parameter τ, or a decline in the R&D elasticity β(t).  
Each innovation is endowed with a given quality level, which can be thought 
of as a measure of the maximum potential rent the innovation can generate. Let qfti 
denote the quality of innovation i of firm f in year t. We assume that innovation 
quality is drawn from a distribution with a firm-specific and time-varying mean: 
 
qfti = qf + qt + ufti, 
 
where ufti has zero mean and constant variance, and qt may be correlated over time. 
The mean of this distribution is unrelated to R&D (this is consistent with micro 
evidence presented in Section 7). Let qft* denote the expected mean quality for the 
firm in a given year. 
The expected profit flow per invention depends on expected innovation 
quality and the relevant market size for the firm, S.  For simplicity, we assume that 
                                                          
2 The empirical evidence indicates that the average lag in the relationship between patents (by date of 
application) and R&D is very short (Hall, Griliches and Hausman, 1986).  
 6
 
 
market size is exogenous and non-stochastic.  Demand for each invention is 
specified as monotonic in the level of sales of the firm: 
 
(2) E(πfti) = qft* α Sftσ   where   α > 0 and σ ∈ [0,1].  
 
This specification of how demand affects the profitability of R&D is standard in 
the empirical literature (Cohen and Levin, 1995). In the extreme case where an 
invention applies to whole of the firm’s market, we have σ = 1 and flow profits 
would be proportional to sales. However, in general an innovation will be relevant 
only to some part of the firm’s market (e.g. the innovation may represent a new 
variety of product that appeals to a subset of tastes). In such cases we expect σ < 1. 
3 
We assume that each innovation enjoys patent protection for T years. The 
flow profit πt depreciates at rate δ during the patent life, and no rent is earned after 
the patent expires. The expected present value of innovation rents net of R&D 
costs for all innovations made by firm f in time t is  
 
(3) E(Πft Rft) = φ qft* α Sftσ e -τt Rftβ(t) - Rft, 
 
where φ = (1-e-(r+δ)T)/(r+δ) is the present value of a dollar of rent over the patent 
life with discount rate r.4  We assume diminishing returns to R&D, as supported by 
numerous empirical studies. (See, Griliches, 1990, for a summary.)  The firm 
                                                          
3 In principle the relevant market size could be larger than current sales (e.g., if a radical innovation 
captured a large part of other firms’ market shares). We are modeling the ‘typical’ innovation.  
4 This is a simplification in two respects. First, some innovations may not be patented (this can easily be 
absorbed in the parameter φ). Second, most patents are terminated by non-payment of patent renewal fees 
before the maximum statutory lifespan is reached.     
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chooses optimal R&D, Rft* = argmax E(Πft Rft). From the first-order condition, we 
get  
(4) Rft* = [e -τtβ(t)φ qft* α Sftσ]1/(1-β(t))  
Let Pft = Nft/Rft denote the number of patents per R&D dollar, which is the 
standard measure of research productivity.  From (1) and (4), we get   
(5) E(Pft  Rft*) = [φβ(t)qft* α Sftσ]-1  
In equilibrium, observed research productivity depends on the ability of the firm to 
appropriate innovation rents (φ), returns to R&D (β), expected quality of 
inventions (q*), and demand (S). An increase in any of these factors raises 
equilibrium R&D spending, reducing research productivity when there are 
diminishing returns. 
Adding a multiplicative error term, we write observed research productivity 
as 
(6) log Pft = - logφβ(t) -α log qft*- σ log Sft + νft, 
where ν is assumed to be a normal, independently and identically distributed  error. 
Given an index of patent quality, we can estimate parameters and test the basic 
predictions of the model: α > 0 and σ ∈ [0,1].  We can also test the null hypothesis 
that technological exhaustion is not a source of change in research productivity 
once quality has been controlled by checking whether there are trended year-
effects in equation (6).    
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2. Description of the Data 
 
The patent data covers U.S. patents applied for during the period 1975-1993 
and issued by the beginning of 2000. It includes those held by all publicly listed 
corporations that had a firm identification code (CUSIP) in the Standard & Poor’s 
CRISP data set in 1989, including all patents assigned to these firms or any of their 
subsidiary bodies, as determined by their corporate structure in 1989.5 These firms 
held 434,108 patents. By drawing on several data sources, we obtained information 
on a range of characteristics for each patent-owning firm and patent.  For all firms, 
we know from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) whether it is foreign 
or domestic, and for a subset we have annual R&D expenditure, sales, capital stock 
and market value. For patents, the variables include: 
 
Claims: The claims in the patent specification delineate the property rights 
protected by the patent.  The principal claims define the essential novel features of 
the invention and subordinate claims describe detailed features of the innovation. 
The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in the application, but 
the patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed before granting.  The 
number of claims is available on a PTO-CD. 
 
Citations: An inventor must cite all related prior U.S. patents in the application.  A 
patent examiner is responsible for insuring that all appropriate patents (and other 
prior art) have been cited.  Like the claims, these identify the rights of the patentee.  
For each patent, we obtained the number of prior patents cited in the application 
                                                          
5 Thus, if firm A acquired firm B after 1989, the existing patent portfolio of firm B would not become part 
of the portfolio of firm A in our data.  Further, firm B would continue as a separate entity in our data but 
would appear to obtain no patents after it was acquired. We thank Adam Jaffe for making these data 
available to us. For details see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999a).   
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(backward citations). We obtained the same information on all subsequent patents 
that had cited a given patent in their own applications, as of the end of 1998 
(forward citations).  We construct two forward citation measures.  Fwd5 includes 
all forward cites to the patent that occur within five years of the patent application 
date, a period which we call the ‘citation span’.  Fwd610 includes citations that 
occur between six and ten years of patent application. The latter can be calculated 
for fewer cohorts, but each indicator treats all patents within eligible cohorts 
symmetrically.  These variables are constructed from data on a PTO-CD. 
 
Family Size: In order to protect an innovation in multiple countries, a patentee 
must secure a patent in each country. We call the group of patents protecting the 
same innovation its ‘family’ (also referred to as parallel patents).  More than two-
thirds of patentees do not seek protection outside their home markets. A small 
fraction finds it worthwhile to patent widely - about five percent of U.S. patent 
owners apply for protection in more than ten countries.  International agreements 
give inventors at most 30 months to file applications worldwide, so family size 
captures information available to the patentee up that date.6 Information on family 
size was provided by Derwent, a private data base vendor. Due to limitations on 
access, we have family data for a random sample of just over 100,000 patents, or 
about 20% of our total population of patents.  
 
Technology Area (USPC): The patent examiner assigns each patent to one or more 
9-digit technology groups, based on the USPC system.  Using these detailed 
assignments, we classify each patent into one of seven, more aggregated classes: 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, Other Health, Chemicals, Computers, Other 
                                                          
6 The Paris Convention gives applicants twelve months to apply in other signatory countries after having 
made the first, or priority, application.  The Patent Cupertino Treaty allows a 25-month period after a 
priority PCT application, increased to 30 months in the late 1980’s. 
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Electronic, and Mechanical.7 For patents with more than one, we use the primary 
technology classification. 
 
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix for the indicators for the pooled sample 
(results are similar by technology group). Since the raw data are skewed, we log 
transform the indicators.8 The numbers of claims, forward cites, backward cites 
and family size vary substantially both across patents within a given technology 
area and across technology fields.  The correlation between forward citations and 
the other indicators does not fall off when we use a longer citation span – compare 
Fwd610 and Fwd5 − which suggests a payoff to using forward citations over a 
longer span when the information is available. 
 
3. Specification and Estimation of the Factor Model 
 
 We use a multiple-indicator model with one latent common factor:  
 
(7) yki = µk  + λk qi + β'Xi + eki, 
 
where yki indicates the value of the kth indicator for the ith patent (in logs, k = 1,..., 
K ); q is the common factor with factor loadings λk;, and X denotes a vector of 
controls. Since q is unobservable, we normalize by setting its variance equal to 
                                                          
7 This classification updates an earlier aggregation of patent classes created by Adam Jaffe.  The 
computer classes are readily identifiable new additions to the USPC system.  The classes designated as 
corresponding to biotechnology follow the PTO’s identification for examination purposes.  These were 
also checked against the distribution across classes of patents owned by biotechnology companies.  We 
thank Josh Lerner for providing the latter information. 
8 When there are zero forward citations, we set the log of this variable to zero. Results are similar if we 
drop such observations.  
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one: q ~ Ν(0, 1).9  Each indicator contains an idiosyncratic error, ek ~ Ν(0, σ2k), 
that captures any variation that is not common to the other indicators in the model.  
The common factor is simply the unobserved characteristic of a patented 
innovation that influences all four of the indicators we use: the number of forward 
cites, backward cites, claims and family size. Because applying for protection in 
each country is costly, family size should be directly related to the expected 
(private) value of protecting an innovation and thus to the value of the innovation 
itself.10 This should reflect both the technological importance of the innovation and 
market opportunities. Forward citations are related most directly to technological 
importance. Forward citations over the long term indicate an innovation has 
contributed to future research. Citations soon after patent application suggests 
rapid recognition of its importance as well as the presence of others working in a 
similar area, and thus the expectation of a valuable technological area. This is also 
true of backward citations, although large numbers of citations to others also 
suggests that the particular innovation is likely to be more derivative in nature 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). The number of claims is also an indication that 
an innovation is broader and of greater potential profitability.  
We call the common factor ‘quality’ because we find it difficult to think of 
any other characteristic that would be common to all four indicators. While 
advances in information technology might increase the number of backward and 
forward citations per patent, by making it easier to search for relevant prior art, 
there is no reason that this would also increase the number of claims per patent. 
Similarly, changes in patent application fees would affect patent family size, and 
possibly the number of claims per patent (as ideas are repackaged into ‘broader’ 
patents), but this would not directly affect the number of citations.  
                                                          
9 The interpretation is the same under an alternative normalisation, such as λk  = 1. For technical 
discussion of latent variable models and their uses, see Bartholomew (1987).  
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The theoretical covariance matrix for the indicators is 
 
(8) Λ = E[yy′] =  λλ′ + Φ 
 
where y is the vector of indicators, now demeaned to control for nationality 
(domestic or foreign) and cohorts, and Φ = E[ee′] is not constrained to be 
diagonal.11 We estimate by maximum likelihood (estimated parameters make the 
theoretical covariance matrix as close as possible to the observed covariance 
structure).  The k-indicator model has K(K+1)/2 covariance terms and 2K 
parameters, and thus K(K-3)/2 over-identifying restrictions. In our study K = 4, so 
there are two testable restrictions. 
The latent variable and K indicators have the joint normal distribution  
 
(9)  ~ N(0, Σ),   where Σ =  


y
q


 ′
Λλ
λ1 . 
 
The posterior mean and variance of the latent variable, conditional on the observed 
indicators, y, are 
 
(10) E[q y]  =  λ′ Λ-1 y, 
 
(11) Var (q y)  = 1 - λ′ Λ-1 λ. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 For related evidence, see Putnam (1996).   
11 The assumption of constant variance in the measurement error is not critical.  Since identification of λ 
comes from the covariance terms in Λ, the important assumption is that each covariance is constant 
across patents (within a given technology field, as we estimate separately).  Of course, if the measurement 
error variances are not constant, the estimates are not efficient and the estimated standard errors may be 
inconsistent. 
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Given λ, equation (10) provides an estimate of the latent variable for each patent 
(as a deviation around mean zero), which we will use as a measure of its quality. 
The conditional posterior mean of the latent variable is a linear combination of the 
set of indicators, where weights depend on the factor loadings. The conditional 
posterior variance of quality is a constant that can be estimated. The term λ′Λ-1λ, 
represents the percentage reduction in the variance of quality due to conditioning 
on the set of indicators, y (since the unconditional variance is normalised to one). 
 
Parameter Estimates    
 
 Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for each technology group. We 
include nationality and cohort effects, and estimate each model separately for two 
sub-periods, 1975-85 and 1986-93, to allow for changes over time in the 
covariance matrix of the indicators. We tested for parameter stability across the 
sub-periods and include pooled estimates in the table when the test is rejected.  
Results are robust to alternative definitions of the sub-periods.12  
 We conduct a sequence of tests and interpret the statistics using both the 
conventional significance criterion and the alternative measure proposed by 
Leamer (1978), which we call the Bayesian-F. Leamer’s criterion has the property 
that, given a diffuse prior distribution, the critical value is exceeded only if the 
posterior odds favor the alternative hypothesis.13 This is useful as any null 
hypothesis will be rejected in large enough samples if the significance level is not 
adjusted for sample size. 
First we test the hypothesis that there is no common factor linking the four 
indicators.  This is decisively rejected in every technology group (p-values 
                                                          
12 Since indicators are in logs, in estimating the factor model we drop observations that have zero values 
for forward citations (all indicators are always positive).  
13 The critical value is F = (T/p)(Tp/T-1) where T is the sample size, T-k is degrees of freedom, and p is the 
number of restrictions being tested. 
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<0.001). Second, we test whether cohort controls are important. Cohort dummies 
are jointly significant in all technology fields, so we include them in the 
subsequent analysis. Finally, we test the two over-identifying restrictions of the 
one-factor model. We reject the restrictions at the five percent significance level 
except in biotechnology and computers. In the other five technology groups we 
relax one of the zero-constraints in the error covariance matrix Φ (the choice was 
made on the basis of the associated gradient of the likelihood function), and test the 
remaining restriction.14  The error covariance chosen to be unrestricted always 
turned out to be the covariance between forward cites and patent family size. This 
is not surprising, as these two indicators both reflect information that accumulates 
after the patent is applied for. When we allow for the desired free covariance 
between forward cites and family size, the remaining restriction is not rejected for 
drugs, other health, chemicals and mechanical patents, using the Bayesian-F. We 
reject the remaining restriction in electronics and tried relaxing different zero 
constraints in Φ without success. We include that category for completeness, but 
those results should be viewed with some caution.  
The lower panel in the table presents estimated signal rates, defined as the 
percentage of variance in an indicator accounted for by the common factor. Signal 
rates vary both across indicators and technology fields.  Forward citations have 
largest signal rate in drugs, whereas patent claims dominate in all of the other 
fields.15  
 
                                                          
14 We introduce flexibility by freeing up a single covariance because we cannot identify a two-factor 
model without another indicator. 
15 Controlling for claims reduces the variance in the forward citations indicator (also holds for backward 
cites). The between-group variance (groups defined by the number of claims) accounts for 7-12 percent of 
the total variance in forward citations, and about 20 percent in drugs and chemicals. However, controlling 
for claims does not increase the signal rate for forward citations.  Letting zfwd = yfwd -yclm denote (log) 
forward cites per claim, the signal rates for zfwd and yfwd are (λfwd-λclm)2/σ2z,fwd and λfwd2 /σ2y,fwd.. Using the 
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4. The Patent Quality Index and Gains from Multiple Indicators 
 
The composite quality index is a linear combination of observed indicators. In 
this section we describe the weights used for the quality index, and discuss two 
advantages of using multiple indicators. The weight for each indicator corresponds 
to the increase in the expected value of quality associated with a unit increase in 
that indicator ∂E[q y]/∂yk . Using equation (10), the weights (normalized to sum to 
unity) are Λ-1λ / ι' Λ-1 λ, where λ is the column vector of estimated factor loadings, 
Λ is the covariance matrix of the indicators and ι a unit vector. 
Table 3 presents the weights based on the parameter estimates in Table 2. For 
drug patents, forward citations get about 48 percent of the weight, with claims 
taking another 28 percent, backward citations nearly 20 percent, with about five 
percent to family size. In the other technology fields, claims are much more 
important than forward cites, the former accounting for more than half the weight. 
Patent family size gets very little weight in the index in drugs, biotechnology and 
chemicals, but plays a larger role for computer patents and, to a lesser extent, in 
electronics and mechanical.  
 
Greater Variance Reduction with Multiple Indicators 
 Because putting together sets of indicators is costly, we analyze the potential 
information gains from using multiple indicators.  It is not necessary to have four 
indicators – the single latent variable model is estimable with any subset of K = 3 
indicators.16  Moreover, it might be convenient to apply the parameters estimated 
here to construct an estimate of q from any available subset of these indicators 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
estimated parameters, we find that forward cites per claim are much noisier than either claims or forward 
cites in all technology groups except mechanical patents. 
16 Of course, the common factor will depend on the subset of indicators used, as will the composite 
quality index.  The model with three indicators is exactly identified and thus not testable. 
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without re-estimating the model, provided it is reasonable to assume a similar 
correlation structure holds across the different sets of data.  Therefore, we analyze 
how the conditional variance of quality, given in equation (11), varies when using 
different subsets of the indicators to predict the latent variable (Table 4).  The 
unconditional variance is normalized to unity, so the entries in the table represent 
the percentage reduction in variance we get by using different subsets of indicators. 
Using all four indicators reduces the conditional variance of quality by about 
a third in drugs, and by more than half in the other technology fields except 
computers (see first row in the table). Forward citations are the most important 
indicator for drugs − if they are dropped from the quality index, the reduction in 
variance is cut in half. In contrast, dropping forward cites has only a modest effect 
in the other technology fields. In those areas, claims are the key indicator − 
dropping them from the quality index cuts the original reduction in variance by 
two-thirds. Patent family size is much less important than forward cites or claims, 
except for computer patents.17 
In short, there is a substantial information gain from using multiple 
indicators to measure the quality of innovations.  Their relative importance is also 
fortuitous since it tracks their relative cost.  Information on the number of claims 
and backward citations is available in the patent application and inexpensive to 
obtain.  Even if we use only these two indicators, we get most of the reduction in 
the conditional variance of quality, except in drugs.  Forward citations are also 
straightforward to obtain, but have the added drawback of taking time to 
accumulate. Family size requires considerable effort to construct. 
 
                                                          
17 We also re-estimated the model using forward citations over a five-year span and then a ten-year span 
(on a common sample of earlier cohorts), and compared the signal rates. Doubling the citation span 
roughly doubles the signal rate in each technology area, and the differences are statistically significant.  
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Improved Understanding of Time Trends 
Most studies that adjust for variation in the quality of patented innovation 
using the single indicator forward citations. A difficulty with using any single 
indicator over time is that the cost of ‘producing’ the indicator may change.  For 
instance, computerization reduces the cost of citing.  It is difficult to disentangle 
this from changes in underlying quality.  On the other hand, for a change in the 
production of an indicator to influence our quality index it would have to affect all 
four indicators, and it is difficult to think of plausible examples. As a result, using 
the indicators together enables us to interpret changes in citation rates (or any other 
single indicator) over time.   
For example, in a study of patent citation rates Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(1999b) show that a patent would have been 1.63 times more likely to be cited in 
1985-93 than in 1977-85, conditional on characteristics of the patent and the size 
of the patent population. As they recognize, this finding combines two very 
different factors: changes in the underlying quality of patents, and changes in the 
ease of citation.  The multiple-indicator factor model allows us to isolate the 
quality-related changes in citation rates. To do this we allow the coefficients in the 
factor model to vary across sub-periods, and use the estimated coefficients to 
compute ∂E[q y]∂y =Λ-1λ for each period. Weighting the estimates across all 
technology fields, we find that an average first-period citation is equivalent to 1.10 
second-period citations in terms of implied patent quality. Comparing this estimate 
with the 1.63 figure from Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, we conclude that about 16 
percent of the increase in citation is due to changes in innovation quality, with the 
remaining 84 percent reflecting an increase in the ‘propensity to cite’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thus it is possible to achieve an even greater reduction in the conditional variance of quality with longer-
term forward citations, so longer spans should be used when feasible. 
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5. Changes in the Patent Quality Index   
 
We demonstrate below that there has been a substantial growth in the quality 
index over time.  We would like to interpret this as the reflection of an upward 
shift in the underlying distribution of innovation. However, the increase in the 
index over time could be the result of rising patent application and enforcement 
costs that cause lower-quality patents to drop out. To discriminate between these 
explanations note that, under the assumption that the quality index is correlated 
with innovation value, shifts in the underlying distribution of innovation should 
shift the composite index for patents throughout the distribution. In the special case 
where there is a proportional shift in the innovation distribution (so the coefficient 
of variation is constant) and the quality index is proportional to innovation value, 
the percentage change in the quality index should be similar in different percentiles 
of the quality distribution.  On the other hand, changes in the cost of patenting that 
shifted the cut-off point on the distribution of innovations that are patented would 
primarily affect patents in the lower quantiles of the distribution.   
Thus, to examine the issue we draw a (fixed size) random sample of patents 
from each cohort in a technology field and compute the mean value of the quality 
index for various percentiles of the distribution of sampled patents, say q (κ,t) for 
the κ-percentile for cohort t.  The ‘test’ involves comparing the percentage change 
in q (κ, t) for different value of κ both over the whole sample period and for cohort 
sub-groups. Table 5 presents results for the cumulative changes over the period 
1975-93. In each technology area, the changes in the quality index are evident both 
in the upper and lower ends of the distribution. This also holds for different sub-
periods (not reported). There is some evidence that increases in the cost of 
patenting may be at work − the changes in the quality index are higher in the lower 
tail of the distributions for electronic and mechanical patents, but not for drugs and 
 19
 
 
chemicals. One would expect changes in patenting costs to affect all technology 
areas in a roughly similar way. This non-parametric evidence suggests that 
variations in the patent quality index are related to changes in the underlying value 
of innovations.  
 
6. Understanding Research Productivity at the Sector Level 
 
 
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the five largest technology fields 
and allocate our firms to these groups. Firms classified in a given SIC industry may 
have patents in multiple technology fields.  In order to assign a given firm to a 
technology field (e.g., to treat it as a drug firm), we require that a plurality of its 
patents during the period 1975-1993 fall into that field. Of such assigned firms, it 
turns out that about three-quarters have at least a majority of their patents in one 
field, and the minimum share is about 25 percent.18  Table 6 presents descriptive 
statistics for these data. There is large variation in firm size as measured by sales, 
R&D intensity (R&D/sales) and research productivity (patents/R&D) both across 
technology fields and within a given field.   
The patent quality index used in the analysis that follows is constructed with 
three indicators – claims, forward citations and backward citations – using 
renormalized weights from Table 3. We do not use family size here because we 
only have family data for a subset of patents and, to compare to R&D aggregates, 
we must have complete patent coverage for each firm.19  
                                                          
18 We made one other adjustment to the sample to take account of major mergers in the drug sector. When 
a merged company takes on a new name, the R&D and patent data are not always merged to produce a 
consistent series for the new firm. We dropped two firms with abnormal breaks in the R&D and patent 
series after confirming they were involved in mergers.  
19 In constructing the weighted patent counts, the log of zero-valued indicators were set to zero rather than 
missing to avoid dropping firms’ lowest-valued patents. In the estimation of the factor model, such 
observations were dropped. 
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Figures 2-6 present the time paths of R&D expenditures, unadjusted research 
productivity (the number of patents divided by R&D), and a patent quality-
adjusted measure of research productivity for each technology field over the period 
1980-93. In pharmaceuticals, R&D increased 2.5 times during the period, mostly 
from 1980-87. There was a concurrent, sharp decline in the patents to R&D ratio, 
by about 50 percent. Adjusting for patent quality in this sector makes a very 
modest difference in measured research productivity over the sample period, and 
the difference disappears by the end of period. In the other sectors the quality 
adjustment is more important in accounting for changes in research productivity. In 
both other health and electronics the patents to R&D ratio fell sharply and then 
rose, ending the period 13 and 20 percent higher, respectively. After adjusting for 
quality, the increase in their productivity by the end of the period was more than 
twice as large. In chemicals, patents/R&D declined by 20 percent, but the quality 
adjustment reduces this fall to 7 percent. Finally, the mechanical field experienced 
quite rapid growth in R&D, nearly doubling over the period. This was 
accompanied by a 40 percent decline in unadjusted research productivity, but a 
moderated 29 percent fall when the quality adjustment is made. 
Thus, it appears that an increase in the quality of patented innovation accounts 
for a sizable share of declines in research productivity when they are observed at 
the sector level, apart from drugs. We emphasise that the interpretation of trends 
does not rest on an identifying assumption that there is a stable relationship 
between quality and the four indicators. (We allow the coefficients in the factor 
model to vary by sub-period. See Section 3.) 
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7.  Research Productivity and Innovation Quality: Micro Evidence 
 
We next examine the role of patent quality and sales in explaining the micro 
level variations in research productivity. The model of Section 1 assumed that 
R&D affects the number of innovations but not their quality (equation 1).  We first 
explore this relationship and then turn to the equilibrium research productivity 
equation (6). 
 
R&D Investment and Quality 
Quality-adjusted patent counts can be either more or less closely correlated 
with R&D than simple patent counts. This depends on whether there are 
differences in the ex ante distributions of innovation quality faced by firms. This 
would occur if firms adopt research strategies for trading off quantity for quality of 
innovation, in which case we expect R&D to be more strongly correlated with 
quality-adjusted patents than with unadjusted patents counts. If, on the other hand, 
the ex ante distribution of quality is the same across firms, differences in the ex 
post average quality of their patents simply reflect stochastic R&D outcomes.  
Then making a quality adjustment would not strengthen the correlation between 
patents and R&D. The latter is what we find: the simple correlation between firm 
R&D and quality-adjusted patent count in the pooled sample is 0.68, which is 
virtually identical to the correlation with unadjusted patent counts. This conclusion 
also holds in each technology field. 
If there is a trade off between the quality and quantity of innovation we 
would also expect a negative relationship between patent counts and mean patent 
quality at the firm level, conditional on R&D. This would generate a different 
relationship between R&D and simple patent counts as compared to R&D and 
quality-adjusted patents. We explored this by estimating a ‘patent production 
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function’ for each technology field. Using the deviations around firm means, we 
regressed the (log) number of new patent applications against the stock of R&D 
and year dummies.20 We also estimated the between-firm regression. For brevity 
we summarize the relevant results. As in many other studies, we find decreasing 
returns to R&D in both the within- and between-firm regressions.21 What is 
striking is that we obtain virtually identical coefficients on R&D when we use 
quality-adjusted patent counts, both in the within- and the between-firm 
regressions. This evidence suggests that variations in patent quality over time at 
the micro level are dominated by stochastic factors rather than by variations in 
R&D expenditures. 
Because variations in patent quality over time (for a given firm) may be 
largely noise, we also investigate whether cross-firm differences in the patent 
quality index are related to the number of patents, conditional on the firm’s R&D 
level.  Again, if firms choose between quality and quantity then we expect a 
negative relationship. We test this by including in the patent production function 
regressions the mean value of the patent quality index for the firm, computed over 
the firm’s patents applied for during the entire sample period: = /Nfqˆ ∑t ftqˆ f.  In the 
within-firm regressions the coefficient on mean patent quality is completely 
insignificant in all technology fields, except drugs where it is positive.22 There is 
no relationship evident in the between-firm regressions. Thus again we find no 
evidence that firms target different quality levels in their R&D strategies.  We 
                                                          
20 Results are similar using the R&D flow rather than stock. The R&D stock is computed using a 
declining balance formula with a depreciation rate of 0.15. To construct the initial stock we assume 
constant past growth rate equal to the average growth in R&D for the firm during the first five years of 
the sample. Results are not sensitive to alternative assumptions.  
21 In the within-firm regressions, the estimated R&D elasticity of patents and its standard error are 0.77 
(.18) in drugs, 0.37 (.095) in other health, 0.55 (.07) in chemicals, 0.64 (.068) in electronics, and 0.36 
(.05) in mechanical. The between-firm estimates are not statistically different from these in drugs or 
electronics, but are larger in the other three fields (this is not surprising since measurement error in R&D 
gets amplified in the ‘within’ dimension). 
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conclude that differences in the (average) quality of their innovations are not 
related to R&D, or that whatever differences are present get swamped by the 
stochastic element in the R&D process.  
  
Research Productivity at the Firm Level 
The equilibrium equation (6) predicts that the log of research productivity 
should be inversely related to the level of log sales and average patent quality, and 
that the coefficient on sales should be less than unity in absolute value. Table 7 
presents parameter estimates for both within-firm and between-firm regressions. 
We include year dummies in the within-firm regressions to capture technological 
exhaustion over the period, and report F-tests of the null hypothesis that these 
coefficients are jointly zero. 
In the within-firm dimension, the evidence is mixed. The variation in 
research productivity over time is very noisy – the regressions explain very little of 
the within-firm variance. This is not surprising, since we expect a large stochastic 
element in R&D outcomes that lead to patenting. Nonetheless, we find that 
changes in research productivity are negatively and significantly related to the 
level of sales in the the drugs, other health, and mechanical technology fields. The 
patent quality index does not explain any of the within-firm variation in research 
productivity. The results are more encouraging in the between-firm regressions. 
The sales and patent quality variables account for between 20 and 40 percent of the 
cross-firm variation in research productivity. Differences across firms in research 
productivity are negatively and significantly related to differences in the level of 
sales in all technology fields, and all of the estimated sales coefficients are less 
than unity, as predicted. In addition, research productivity is strongly and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 This positive coefficient probably reflects unobserved heterogeneity in research capability, for which 
the mean patent quality for a firm is serving as a proxy. 
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negatively related to the patent quality index in the electronics and mechanical 
technology fields, and weakly so in other health (with no relationship in drugs or 
chemicals). We do not reject the hypothesis that there are no year effects in the 
within-firm regression for drugs, chemicals and mechanical fields. Although we do 
reject the hypothesis for electronics, the estimated year effects (not reported) do 
not show any systematic decline over the sample period. In the context of the 
model in Section 1 (equation 6), this evidence provides no support for the 
hypothesis of technological exhaustion at the micro-level, once we control for sales 
and patent quality.23 
 
8. Stock Market Value and Innovation Quality 
 
 The results above indicate that accounting for the relative quality of patented 
innovation helps in understanding the relationship between research inputs and 
patent counts.  We now consider whether accounting for quality is also useful in 
understanding how the stock market values patented innovation. 24 
We use the approach developed by Griliches (1981) and applied in many 
subsequent studies. We estimate an equation that relates the value of Tobin’s Q for 
the firm (the ratio of market value to capital stock) to the stock of patents, plus year 
and technology field effects.25 The market value of firm f in year t is the sum of the 
value of the stocks of physical and knowledge capital: 
                                                          
23 We also tested the hypothesis that there are no year effects in the within-firm regression that excludes 
the sales and patent quality index. The finding for drugs is reversed – the F-statistic rises from 0.91 to 
2.81 when we drop sales and the patent quality index. The conclusions are unchanged in the other fields.  
24 We also examined whether the quality of innovations is related to the firm’s decision to maintain patent 
protection by paying periodic renewal fees. Patent renewal models imply that, at any age, the likelihood 
of renewal should increase in the profit associated with the patent, equation 2 (e.g., Schankerman and 
Pakes, 1986). We estimate probit regressions for patent renewals at various ages (four, eight and twelve, 
as required in the U.S.). The coefficient on qf is positive and significant in all technology areas.  
25 Following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999b), we compute market value as the sum of the values of 
common stock, preferred stock, long-term debt and short-term debt net of assets. Book value of capital 
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(12) MVft = (ηt Cft + ρtKft)ψ, 
 
where η and ρ denote the shadow prices of physical and knowledge capital, 
respectively.  Assuming constant returns to scale (ψ = 1) and that the shadow price 
of each capital stock is equalized across firms in equilibrium, 
 
 (13) log (MV/C)ft = ηt + log (1+ µt Kft /Cft ). 
 
MV/C is the conventional measure of Tobin’s Q and µt = ρt/ηt is the shadow price 
of knowledge capital relative to physical capital in year t. The equation is 
estimated by non-linear least squares. We include either the cumulative number of 
patents or of quality-adjusted patents (Nstk and Vstk, respectively) as our measure 
of the knowledge stock.26  Since the mean quality is not unity, we have scaled the 
estimated coefficients (and standard error) on Vstk in Table 8 so that it can be 
compared directly to the coefficients on Nstk. We include year effects in the 
regression to pick up variation in ηt. The baseline specification treats µ as constant 
over time. We also allowed it to vary across three sub-periods in the sample and 
the results were similar to those reported here.27  We also include the firm’s 
average patent quality index, q , in the regression. This allows us to examine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
includes net plant and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles 
(other than R&D).   
26 Two points should be noted. First, the patent quality index used in these regressions is constructed with 
three indicators – claims, forward citations and backward citations – using the renormalized weights from 
Table 3. We do not use family size because it is only available for about 20 percent of patents. We 
checked robustness by running the regressions using only the subset with family data, and the qualitative 
results were similar. Second, both the raw and quality-adjusted patent stocks are computed using a 
depreciation rate of 0.15.    
27 In the drugs, electronics and mechanical fields, the estimated µ increased from the early period 1980-84 
to 1985-89 and then declined, while in other health and chemicals it rose throughout the sample period. 
For related evidence on the returns to R&D, see Hall (1993b).  
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whether cross-section differences in patent quality are valued by the stock market, 
in addition to any over time variations in patent quality.28 These between-firm 
differences account for a substantial part, about 40 percent, of the overall variance 
in the patent quality index in each technology field. 
As expected, the results show that the market value is positively related to 
the stock of patents held by the firm (before any quality adjustment). In each of the 
technology fields, when we use the quality-adjusted patent stock, we find that there 
is relatively little change in the estimated coefficient on the patent stock variable 
and virtually no improvement in the regression fit. Not surprisingly, the coefficient 
on average patent quality index, q , falls somewhat since some of the effect is 
being picked up by the new patent stock. This evidence indicates that variations 
over time in a firm’s patent quality (i.e., averaged over its patents) are mostly 
swamped by idiosyncratic variation and, as such, are not be well identified by 
investors. 
However, in four out of five technology areas, the stock market value is 
positively related to the mean quality at the firm level, given the stocks of capital 
and quality-adjusted patent counts (the exception is chemicals). This finding is 
robust – it also holds when we drop the year effects and we allow the relative 
shadow price µ to change over time. This result implies that investors have enough 
information to distinguish differences in mean patent quality across companies. 
The estimated effects of the cross-sectional differences in quality on market value 
are large, especially for drug and other health patents. For example, using the point 
estimates from the regression with Nstk and q , we find that increasing q for a firm 
from the 50th percentile to the 75th percentile in the distribution would increase its 
market value by 9.4 percent for drugs, 7.7 in other health, 2.5 in electronics and 1.3 
                                                          
28 This means that the market value in year t is a function of the firm’s mean quality index for patents 
applied for after t. This is reasonable if the market has enough cumulated information to estimate firm-
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for mechanical.  Improving the firm’s average patent quality index from the 50th to 
the 95th percentile would raise its market value by 20.2 percent for drugs, 19.6 in 
other health, 7.3 in electronics and 3.9 in mechanical. This strong empirical link 
between the firm-specific patent quality index and market value may be useful in 
developing techniques for valuing patent portfolios held by firms, for trading and 
other purposes.  
 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we analyse the determinants of changes in measured research 
productivity (the patent/R&D ratio) using panel data on manufacturing firms in the 
U.S. for the period 1980-93. We focus on three factors: the level of demand, the 
quality of patents, and technological exhaustion. We first develop an index of 
patent ‘quality’ using detailed information on patents in the U.S. in seven 
technology fields during 1975-93. Using a factor model, we construct a minimum-
variance index based on four patent characteristics – the numbers of claims, 
forward citations, backward citations, and patent family size – and we demonstrate 
that using multiple indicators substantially reduces the measured variance in patent 
quality. Forward citations are the most important indicator for drug patents while 
the number of claims is the most important in the other six technology fields. 
Using multiple indicators reduces the variance in patent quality by between 20 and 
73 percent, which confirms that there is large information gain from exploiting 
detailed patent characteristics.  
We show that the patent quality index helps account for part of the time 
series variation in research productivity at the sector level, but the explanatory 
power differs across technology fields. At the micro-level, differences in research 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
specific quality.  
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productivity are negatively related to patent quality and the level of demand, as 
predicted by an optimizing model of R&D. We also find that cross-section 
differences in patent quality are strongly associated with the market valuation of 
firms, with an especially large effect in pharmaceuticals and other health. This 
suggests that the quality index may be useful in understanding variations in the 
stock market valuation of patent stocks, and for evaluating bundles of patents for 
cross licensing and patent pooling arrangements. 
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Table 1. Correlation Structure of Indicators  
 Claims Family Fwd5 Fwd610 
Family .103 
 
   
Fwd5 .138 
 
.098 
 
  
Fwd610 .115 
 
.099 
 
.390 
 
 
Bwd 
Cites 
.143 
 
.044 
 
.093 
 
.083 
 
Notes: Entries are correlation coefficients for the pooled sample. All are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Variables are in logarithms.  
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Table 2.  Parameter Estimates for the One-Factor Model, By Technology 
Field 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
(log) 
 
 
Drugs 
 
 
Biotech 
 
Other 
Health 
 
 
Chemicals 
 
 
Computers 
 
 
Electronic 
 
 
Mechanical 
 
Fwd5 
 
 
0.49 
(.043) 
 
0.29 
(.028) 
 
0.29 
(.013) 
 
0.18 
(.048) 
 
0.22 
(.012) 
(1975-85) 
 
 
 
0.19 
(.066) 
  
 
 
 
0.25 
(.028) 
0.32 
(.014) 
 
Claims 
 
0.30 
(.030) 
0.52 
(.042) 
0.48 
(.019) 
0.29 
(.066) 
0.52 
(.022) 
(1975-85) 
 
 
0.84 
(.20) 
   
0.54 
(.054) 
0.41 
(.016) 
 
Family 
 
0.12 
(.025) 
0.19 
(.028) 
0.16 
(.012) 
0.35 
(.077) 
0.14 
(.032) 
 
(1975-85) 
 
0.14 
(.060) 
   
0.17 
(.011) 
0.23 
(.013) 
 
Bwd Cites 
 
(1975-85) 
0.30 
(.037) 
0.37 
(.099) 
0.35 
(.030) 
0.23 
(.024) 
0.31 
(.014) 
0.11 
(.045) 
0.19 
(.021) 
0.29 
(.012) 
0.12 
(.028) 
0.28 
(.013) 
 
No. Obs. 
 
4,709 
 
453 
 
3,858 
 
28,106 
 
2,326 
 
39,070 
 
34,237 
 
1FM, χ2 (2) 
(p-value) 
 
12.8 
(.002) 
 
 
0.6 
(0.76) 
 
14.7 
(.001) 
 
91.2 
(<.001) 
 
0.7 
(.69) 
 
90.1 
(<.001) 
 
78.6 
(<.001) 
 
Generalized 
1FM, χ2 (1) 
(p-value) 
4.0 
(.045) 
 
 
7.6 
(.006) 
15.2 
(.005) 
 
 
47.8 
(<.001) 
 
0.7 
(.41) 
 
 
Sfwd 
 
0.28 
(.049) 
 
0.053 
(.037) 
 
0.17 
(.017) 
 
0.12 
(.011) 
 
0.04 
(.02) 
 
0.08 
(.018) 
 
0.07 
(.007) 
 
Sclm 
 
0.13 
(.027) 
 
0.82 
(.38) 
 
0.29 
(.066) 
 
0.37 
(.029) 
 
0.13 
(.059) 
 
0.51 
(.10) 
 
0.42 
(.035) 
 
Sfam 
 
0.01 
(.003) 
 
0.01 
(.01) 
 
0.056 
(.007) 
 
0.02 
(.003) 
 
0.13 
(.056) 
 
0.03 
(.004) 
 
0.02 
(.008) 
 
Sbwd 
 
0.10 
(.025) 
 
0.16 
(.085) 
 
0.17 
(.034) 
 
0.08 
(.016) 
 
0.02 
(.017) 
 
0.06 
(.013) 
 
0.02 
(.011) 
 
Notes:  Nationality and cohort dummies included. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Bold indicates 
statistical significance at the five percent level. The signal rate for indicator k (period 1986-93) is Sk =λk2 /σ k2 where 
the point estimate of λk is used. The approximate standard error is computed as 2λkσ (λk)/σ k2.  χ2 (2) tests the over-
identifying restrictions in the one-factor model. χ2(1) tests the restriction in a ‘generalized’ one-factor model that 
allows non-zero covariance between measurement errors in forward citations and family size.  
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Table 3.  Weights in the Patent Quality Index  
 
 
% Weight 
on (log): 
 
Drugs 
 
Biotech 
 
Other 
Health 
 
Chemicals 
 
Computers 
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
        
Claims 29.8       72.0 53.1 49.2 37.3 44.5 52.3
        
Fwd5 46.1       12.8 13.6 23.0 16.2 21.3 14.7
        
Bwd Cites  21.2       13.9 29.4 23.7 15.3 27.1 24.8
        
Family  2.9  1.2 3.9  4.1 31.2  7.1  8.3 
 
Notes:  Based on cohorts 1986-93. Weights are estimated values for Λ-1λ / ι' Λ-1 λ, where λ is the column vector 
factor loadings, Λ is the covariance matrix of the indicators, net of nationality and cohort effects, and ι a unit vector. 
Each weight corresponds to ∂E[q y]/∂yk , summed to one.  
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Table 4.  Information Content in Alternative Sets of Indicators:  
Percentage Reduction in Variance of Patent Quality 
 
 
Subset of 
Indicators 
 
 
Drugs 
 
Biotech
 
Other 
Health 
 
Chemicals 
 
Computers 
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
Fwd5, Claims, 
Family, Bwd 
Cites 
 
42.1 
 
83.9 
 
55.0 
 
48.9 
 
28.8 
 
47.6 
 
53.5 
Drop Fwd5 21.6       82.3 52.5 43.1 26.3 40.9 50.7
Drop Claims 34.8       21.2 26.3 23.9 18.2 26.5 21.8
Drop Family 41.9       83.8 54.7 48.6 18.3 46.7 52.1
Drop Fwd5 and 
Family 
 
21.3 
 
82.2 
 
51.9 
 
42.3 
 
15.1 
 
39.4 
 
48.9 
 
Notes:  Computed as λ′ Λ-1 λ = Var(q)-Var(q| y), using estimated λ for cohorts 1986-93 and covariance matrix Λ, net 
of cohort effects, for the relevant set of indicators.  
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Table 5.  Changes in Patent Quality Index, by Percentile (percent) 
 
Percentile 
 
 
Drugs 
 
Chemicals
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
Top 5% 24.5 27.0 19.7 16.0 
     
10% 21.3 24.3 20.1 16.7 
     
50% 23.2 21.6 21.9 19.7 
     
90% 27.1 24.1 25.3 23.0 
     
95% 27.9 24.9 25.9 23.8 
  
Notes: Each cell gives the mean percentage increase in the average quality for a 
randomly drawn (without replacement) sample of 787 patents per year in each 
technology field, 1975-93. 787 is the minimum number of patents in any year in 
any technology area.  Three technologies are excluded due to small numbers in the 
early years.  Similar patterns hold for sub-periods 1975-84 and 1984-93, although 
changes are smaller for the second period. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: Firm-Level Sample 
 
Median of: 
 
Drugs 
Other 
Health 
 
Chemicals 
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
      
Sales  (1998 $m) 109.2 39.6 418.8 122.5 302.3 
      
R&D/Sales (%) 13.2 8.0 2.3 5.8 1.4 
      
Patents/R&D (per 
$m) 
0.27 0.59 0.58 0.46 0.54 
      
Number of firms 69 68 322 410 664 
 
Notes: Both sales and R&D data are deflated. The reported number of firms is the 
maximum available for any single variable. Actual sample sizes vary in the 
different regression analyses.  
 35
 
 
   
Table 7.  Research Productivity, Patent Quality and Market Demand         
 
 
  
Drugs 
 
Other Health 
 
Chemicals 
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
 
Within-
Regression 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
OLS 
` 
IV 
           
  qˆ 0.02 
(.085) 
0.46 
(.23) 
-0.18 
(.094) 
0.05 
(.37) 
-0.14 
(.06) 
-0.03 
(.14) 
-0.01 
(.05) 
-0.19 
(.17) 
 0.09 
(.045) 
0.26 
(.14) 
           
Log Sales -0.23 
(.05) 
-0.22 
(.05) 
-0.25 
(.06) 
-0.14 
(.07) 
0.068 
(.05) 
0.30 
(.07) 
-0.03 
(.04) 
0.01 
(.04) 
-0.08 
(.03) 
-0.08 
(.04) 
           
R2 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.03  0.02 0.02 0.014 0.003 
           
F-test 
H0: β(t) = β 
  0.91    0.85  1.48  2.64  1.80  
           
No. Obs. 460 385 394 291 1469 1170 1906 1461 2208 1681 
           
Between-
Regression 
          
  qˆ 0.71 
(.48) 
1.36 
(.95) 
-0.25 
(.51) 
0.97 
(1.42) 
0.02 
(.28) 
0.04 
(.50) 
-0.80 
(.22) 
-0.95 
(.53) 
-0.67 
(.20) 
-0.84 
(.41) 
           
Log Sales -0.14 
(.06) 
-0.16 
(.06) 
-0.38 
(.06) 
-0.37 
(.06) 
-0.33 
(.034) 
-0.31 
(.034) 
-0.32 
(.03) 
-0.31 
(.034) 
-0.39 
(.030) 
-0.37 
(.030)
           
R2 0.19 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.29 
           
No. Obs. 63 62 63 63 226 218 312 311 387 381 
 
Notes: OLS uses no instrument for q. IV uses lag q as the instrument for q − the R2 in the first-
stage regression varies from 0.12 to 0.24. ‘Within’ denotes the regression with fixed firm and 
year effects. Bold indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. The F-statistic tests 
the null hypothesis that there are no year effects (no technological exhaustion) in the OLS model. 
‘Between’ is the regression done on firm means of variables. 
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Table 8.  Stock Market Value and Patent Quality 
 
  
Drugs 
 
Other Health 
 
Chemicals 
 
Electronics 
 
Mechanical 
 
Nstk/C 
 
.070 
  
0.072 
  
.052 
  
.072 
  
.174 
 
 (.013)  (.012)  (.008)  (.006)  (.013)  
           
Vstk/C  .076  .067  .059  .069  .164 
  (.014)  (.011)  (.007)  (.006)  (.013) 
           
q  .302 
(.11) 
.242 
(.11) 
.479 
(.10) 
.422 
(.11) 
-.070 
(.028) 
-.082 
(.028) 
.137 
(.024) 
.119 
(.024) 
.074 
(.019) 
.058 
(.019) 
           
R2 .62 .63 .60 0.60 .21 .22 .50 .50 .28 .29 
           
No. Obs. 489 489 575 575 2360 2360 3209 3209 4731 4831 
 
Notes: Estimated by non-linear least squares, with year effects included. Bold 
indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. Nstk is the stock of 
patents, Vstk is the stock of quality-adjusted patents, C is capital stock, and q  is the 
mean value of the patent quality index for a firm. The quality index is computed 
using three indicators, without patent family size, with weights renormalized.  
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Figure 1:  R&D and Patenting
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Figure 2:  Pharmaceuticals 
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Figure 3: Other Health 
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Figure 4:  Chemicals
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Figure 5: Electronics
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Figure 6: Mechanical
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